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The Christian Social Union (CSU) has ruled Bavaria continuously for sixty years. The CSU’s 
domination of the province’s political scene, together with its influence on federal policies 
through its partnership with the CDU in the Bundestag, has made the party one of the most 
effective groups in Europe. In the medium term Bavaria will have to face challenges connect-
ed with the transformation and digitisation of industry, which could undermine the province’s 
current economic model. In addition, the CSU is being confronted on the political scene by 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a grouping which has a similar profile to the CSU in several 
aspects. The elections on 14 October 2018 could permanently change the balance of power in 
Bavaria’s Landtag, lead to a serious weakening of the CSU’s dominance in Bavaria, and affect 
Germany’s federal politics.
The CSU owes its electoral success to a conservative profile combined with the province’s eco-
nomic achievements, as well as the ability to adapt its programme to changing social trends. 
Voters see the party as both a guarantor of Bavaria’s economic success and the advocate of 
the interests of vulnerable social groups. However, the CSU is undergoing a transformation 
which may result in it losing its status as a mass party appealing to all social groups. These 
changes are structural in nature; they result primarily from the aging of its traditional elec-
torate and the inflow into Bavaria of residents from other German provinces. This process is 
overlapping with a strong polarisation within German society (including Bavaria) regarding its 
approach to the migration crisis. The biggest beneficiary of these changes has been the AfD. 
A good result for this party in the elections to the Bavarian parliament could permanently 
change the balance of political forces there. The CSU would be unable to defend an absolute 
majority, and it would have to seek coalition partners in order to form further governments.
The CSU is the only province-level party with 
federal representation, and its road towards 
federal-level politics led through its success in 
the province1. From the beginning the other 
groups in the Bundestag needed to build up 
a political position at the federal level, which 
1 Local political parties operate in various provinces (such 
as the Brandenburger Vereinigte Bürgerbewegungen 
/ Freie Wähler, Bürger in Wut, Freie Wähler in Bavaria 
in Brandenburg, Südschleswigscher Wählerverband), 
but they do not participate in federal politics.
to a great extent has been subordinated to the 
creation of regional structures and efforts to 
win support for them in successive provincial 
elections. The CSU has been present in federal 
politics since the creation after the parliamen-
tary elections in 1949 of its joint parliamen-
tary group with the CDU in the Bundestag. 
The CDU’s coalition with the CSU (and the FDP) 
was essential to the formation of Konrad Ade-
nauer’s first cabinet in 1949–1953. The CSU 
became quite a disciplined part of the Chris-
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tian Democrats’ group (while creating its own 
provincial party), which resulted in the con-
solidation of the close cooperation between 
them. The consequence was that the CSU has 
participated in all the CDU governments (1949– 
1969, 1982–1998 and since 2005). However, 
no chairman of the CSU has ever been chosen 
as the Federal Chancellor, although twice the 
CDU/CSU’s choice for that position has fallen to 
a politician from Bavaria – Franz Josef Strauss in 
1980, and Edmund Stoiber in 2002.
The value of the CDU/CSU alliance
In the Bundestag, the CSU makes up a joint 
parliamentary group with the CDU. Within this 
framework, the CSU deputies also make up 
a provincial group, which de facto is a party 
within a party. Its chairman is usually one of 
the CSU’s most influential politicians and a con-
tender for one of the two main functions in the 
party, either the president or prime minister of 
Bavaria. Every few years the threat of the CDU 
and CSU separating and becoming independent 
within the Bundestag arises, but due to their 
mutual interest in maintaining the status quo, 
this is not a realistic prospect. In the 1970s, as 
fundamental policy differences and personali-
ty conflicts began to arise, some members of 
the CSU began to demand that they leave the 
common group in the Bundestag, and also that 
they should consider running as independents 
in parliamentary elections in other provinces2. 
The CSU has also raised some of these objec-
tions again more recently, but this has primarily 
served as a way of ‘raising the stakes’ in coalition 
negotiations with the CDU, and of disciplining 
the party and getting it to knuckle under to its 
leader. The most serious crisis in relations be-
tween the parties occurred in 1976, when the 
Christian Democrats were in opposition. This 
led to the CSU voting to split the group, but 
2 The discrepancy was brought about by what the CSU 
leadership saw as the overly leftist programme of the 
CDU, as well as the CDU’s support for the normalisation 
of relations with Communist Poland in the 1970s. 
after a threat by the CDU’s chairman, Helmut 
Kohl, that his party would be ready to create 
local structures in Bavaria, the CSU withdrew its 
decision after three weeks.
A split would mean losses for both parties. For 
the CDU, the lack of the CSU’s support would 
mean less political strength at the federal level 
and make it more difficult to build coalitions; so 
far the CSU have won between 10% and 20% 
support for the joint Christian Democrat group 
in parliamentary elections3. Moreover, the ex-
pectation that the CDU will collaborate with 
the CSU in the Bundestag has also encouraged 
conservatives from other provinces to vote for 
the CDU. However, the effects of a split would 
be more painful for the CSU. The creation of 
two parties would lead to the CDU establish-
ing local structures in Bavaria, and drain away 
some of the CSU’s voters in provincial and fed-
eral elections. This would make it significant-
ly harder for the CSU to form one-party gov-
ernments in Bavaria, and would likely lead to 
the end (or a significant reduction) of its pres-
ence in the Bundestag. This would weaken the 
CSU’s influence on federal policy, especially if 
it refused to participate in CDU-led govern-
ments, and also reduce its electoral subsidies. 
The CSU would become a primarily regional 
party, which neither the party’s members nor 
its voters want. In the Bundestag, the provincial 
group would probably disintegrate, some of 
the Bavarian party activists would cross over to 
the CDU, and the CSU would become margin-
alised. The CSU used to be the third or fourth 
biggest political force in Bonn (alternating with 
3 In the current term, the CSU has 46 deputies, whereas 
the CDU has 200. 
The creation of two parties would lead to 
the CDU establishing local structures in 
Bavaria and drain away some of the CSU’s 
voters in provincial and federal elections.
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the FDP), the main adversary of the SPD, and 
a driver of German public debate (notably in 
the Bundestag debate between the SPD chair-
man Herbert Wehner and Franz Josef Strauss in 
1975). A CSU standing alone at the federal level 
would be much less influential; the risk of the 
CDU coming to an agreement with the Greens 
and the FDP without the CSU would rise. 
The establishment of local structures by the 
CSU in other provinces to strengthen its rep-
resentation in the Bundestag would be lengthy, 
costly and extremely difficult, not only because 
of the existing structures of the CDU, but also 
in the light of the rise of the AfD.
Bavaria first!
In the German federal system, Bavaria plays 
a special role – not only as one of the most im-
portant states, generating around 20% of Ger-
many’s GDP, and as leader of the sixteen con-
stituent Bundesländer in negotiations between 
the provinces and the federation (for example, 
regarding federal subsidies in connection with 
the provinces’ burden caused by the migration 
crisis). It is also the most active defender of the 
provinces retaining their competence (such as 
in the fields of education and security), as well 
as the author of solutions which are then ac-
cepted by other provinces or the entire country. 
The economic power of this province is rooted 
both in the dynamic growth of its GDP and the 
lowest unemployment figures in Germany for 
years, as well as the location of the largest Ger-
man companies in Bavaria and their internation-
al expansion (see Figure 1). Maintaining these 
trends is crucial for the province itself, as well as 
for the whole of Germany, for reasons includ-
ing the boost to the federal budget from its tax 
revenues, and its support for the more poorly 
developed provinces with financial transfers.
The CSU’s participation in federal politics is sub-
ordinated to the interests of the group in Ba-
varia, which often makes it serve as a quasi-op-
position within its government coalition with 
the CDU. The main lines of dispute between the 
sister parties now concern migration, domes-
tic security and European policy issues. In the 
past, the policies disputed included Germany’s 
Eastern policy, the attitude to the US, and the 
issue of whether Germany should have nucle-
ar weapons, something Franz Josef Strauss did 
not rule out4. The CSU’s political presence in 
the Bundestag not only allows the realisation of 
projects which are important from the point of 
view of the Bavarian electorate, but also gives 
it access to the nationwide media and a pres-
ence in different constituent bodies at the fed-
eral level5. This translates to national popularity 
for individual politicians in Bavaria and builds 
a sense of the party’s strength. It also strength-
ens their advantage over other groups in the 
Bavarian state parliament, and makes it difficult 
for the opposition to take power in Bavaria.
The CSU’s most important objective is to main-
tain its independent rule in Bavaria. This ob-
jective is also served by initiatives taken at the 
federal level. Poor results in the provincial elec-
tions translate to a weaker political position in 
Berlin, not only within the CDU/CSU in the Bun-
destag, but also in the Bundesrat and the Fed-
eral Assembly. Combining two levels of policy 
– the federal and the provincial – also generates 
4 P. Gassert, Streiten wie zu Strauß‘ Zeiten, Die Zeit 3 July 
2018, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2018-07/
cdu-csu-streit-geschichte-franz-josef-strauss/komplet-
tansicht
5 In the last two terms, policies introduced at the federal 
level at the initiative of Bavaria have included an annu-
al upper limit on the number of refugees accepted into 
the country (Obergrenze); fees for drivers of cars and 
camping vehicles using the German motorways and na-
tional roads; and the expansion of the beneficiaries of 
pensions for mothers (Mütterrente).
The CSU’s most important objective is 
to maintain its one-party rule in Bavaria. 
This is also assisted by initiatives at the 
federal level.
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problems. Working for Bavaria’s interests at the 
federal level, promoting the CSU’s solutions 
and engaging in politics in Berlin shows voters 
how strong and important the party is. On the 
other hand, the Bavarian electorate sometimes 
perceives the party’s overly intense involvement 
in federal or European politics as a departure 
from the CSU’s regional priorities. Despite this, 
the CSU usually aspires to play a significant role 
in federal politics, shape the policy of Germa-
ny as a whole, and implement solutions which 
affect not only Bavaria, but the entire country. 
The most important topics for CSU at the feder-
al level, broadly understood, are domestic secu-
rity, foreign policy and social policy.
The CSU’s identity: back to the roots?
Since the party was founded in 1945, two con-
cepts for development have clashed within it. 
The first favoured the conservative and Catholic 
character of the party, manifesting itself in the 
maintenance of close relations with the Catho-
lic Church traditionally dominant in Bavaria 
(including by reference to the Church’s social 
teaching, participation in events of a religious 
nature, and the introduction of religious edu-
cation in schools) without corresponding con-
tacts with the Protestant churches. The second 
concept proposed the extension of its political 
offer to moderate voters (especially in the ap-
proach to the social elements of the post-war 
reforms, such as the nationalisation of selected 
companies and agricultural reform) and taking 
the sensitivities of the Protestant community 
into account. The turning point in the dispute 
came after its only loss of power in Bavaria 
since 1949, when the SPD won in 1954. This led 
to changes in the structure and leadership of 
the party: the new leader Hanns Seidel ended 
the Catholic activists’ dispute with the Protes-
tants over the emphases in CSU policy, creating 
a more moderate profile for the party. In 1961, 
Franz Josef Strauss became head of the party, 
and led it for 27 years until his death in 1988. 
His reign and style of government led to the 
identification of the CSU as the only political 
representation of Bavaria. Strauss was and re-
mains a legendary figure on the German polit-
ical scene, and the pillars of his party’s policy 
as he defined them – conservatism, modernisa-
tion, regionalism – still stand today. 
The CSU presents itself as the only authentic 
party with a right-wing profile, treating groups 
further to the right of itself as extreme and un-
democratic. The CSU thus continues the policy 
of Franz Josef Strauss, whose motto was that 
“no democratic party may arise to the right of 
the CSU”. The Bavarian group has so far been 
the main party of conservative views represent-
ed in the Bundestag. With the progressive rap-
prochement of the CDU’s policy programme to 
those of the SPD and the Greens since 20056, 
the CSU remains the main force shaping public 
debate on the centre-right. However, this status 
is currently being threatened by the Alternative 
for Germany, which entered the Bundestag in 
2017 and has appropriated this space, present-
ing itself as the only party which truly proclaims 
conservative values.
The process of defending itself against margin-
alisation and the shift of some of its voters to 
6 One manifestation of this process was the introduction 
of the minimum wage, the possibility of having dual 
citizenship, the professionalisation of the army, rescu-
ing the euro zone, and the policy f energy transition. 
These actions by the Christian Democrats succeeded in 
building them a strong position in the political centre, 
but also made it increasingly difficult to distinguish their 
program from those of the SPD or even the Greens. See 
Artur Ciechanowicz, Predictability lost: the German 
political scene after the elections, ‘OSW Commentary’, 
22 November 2017; https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-11-22/predictabili-
ty-lost-german-political-scene-after-elections
The CSU presents itself as the only au-
thentic party with a right-wing profile, 
treating groups further to the right of itself 
as extreme and undemocratic.
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the AfD, as well as opposition to its move away 
from traditional values (as in its migration poli-
cy), will force the conservative CSU into defend-
ing its identity more seriously than before. This 
aim was served by the manifesto published at 
the beginning of 2018 by Alexander Dobrindt, 
the head of the CSU’s parliamentary group in 
the Bundestag and one of the leaders of the par-
ty’s traditionalist wing7. According to Dobrindt, 
there is a need for a “conservative revolution” 
to respond to the “turn to the left” which has 
been ongoing in Germany since 1968. Dobrindt 
emphasises that the time of “left-wing ideolo-
gies, social-democratic statism and Green pro-
hibitions” has passed away, and that “the new 
Islamism threatening the freedom of Europe 
should not get the opportunity to solidify”. 
The CSU also accuses the German media of 
bias in the public debate, which, according to 
the Bavarian party, has undergone a “left-wing 
bent”. The answer should be the resurrection of 
the so-called guiding culture (Leitkultur), which 
should be the measure of “bourgeois-conserv-
ative change” in Germany. In this way the CSU 
is drawing upon the main elements of its tradi-
tional political programme. These consist of the 
Christian family as the foundation of social life, 
Bavarian regionalism, limits to immigration, ef-
fective social care and low taxes, and the do-
mestic security which is the traditional watch-
word of the party.
7 A. Dobrindt, Whirlpool brauchen eine bürgerlich-kon-
servativ Wende, ,Die Welt’, 04.01.2018, https://www.
welt.de/debatte/kommentare/plus172133774/Warum-
wir-nach-den-68ern-eine-buergerlich-konservative-
Wende-brauchen.html 
The political offer: tradition and modern-
isation, social policy and Heimat
For the CSU, the synergy of tradition and mo-
dernity has laid the foundation of success for 
both the party and the province. The CSU’s slo-
gan of ‘Laptop und Lederhosen’ symbolises Ba-
varia’s transition from a province of agriculture 
to one of industry, where high technologies are 
being developed. The evolution of the party’s 
position has primarily concerned the economy, 
but has also sometimes involved philosophical 
issues, including emphasising the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
in its manifesto. One important influence on 
the programme’s evolution was the fact that 
for years the traditional Bavarian-born Catho-
lic electorate (two thirds of Catholics in Bavaria 
vote for the CSU) has been shrinking, while res-
idents from other provinces have been arriving, 
and young people have been turning to social 
media as their primary source of information. 
However, the CSU has not shut itself away with-
in the circle of its loyal traditional voters, and is 
creating a base of policies for the wider elector-
ate. Tradition is being linked to modern region-
alism, and modernisation to a more broadly 
understood security and social policy.
The CSU presents itself as the guarantor of Ba-
varia’s economic success, but also as an advo-
cate for the economic interests of vulnerable 
social groups. For them, social policy is the 
second pillar of the German economy next to 
the free market; the intention is to offer equal 
opportunities and protect the weakest, espe-
cially taking into account the changes to the 
province’s demography and labour market, as 
well as the challenges of digitisation. The use 
of slogans about modernisation and support-
ing entrepreneurship with social funding has in 
the past prevented a mass exodus of voters to 
the SPD and won broad support for econom-
ic changes. The CSU’s social sensitivity has also 
played an important role in its discussions with 
The CSU presents itself as the only au-
thentic party with a right-wing profile, 
treating groups further to the right of itself 
as extreme and undemocratic.
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the CDU. In 2003, Edmund Stoiber (the then 
leader of the party) got the CDU to give up their 
plans to limit Germany’s social policy.
At present the CSU’s priorities in social pol-
icy, in addition to broad support for families, 
include tackling long-term unemployment, as 
well as providing equal access to public ser-
vices for people with disabilities. Moreover, its 
social policy combines slogans about tax relief 
and a balanced budget with an acceptance of 
regional regulations concerning selected taxes 
(such as inheritance taxes), as well as a reduc-
tion in taxes for top earners with assistance for 
the elderly. One of the main elements of the 
CSU’s social policy is to expand the availability 
of housing and halt the rise in rents, which is 
a growing problem for large German cities, in-
cluding Munich.
Bavarian regionalism is still an important ele-
ment of the CSU’s identity as a mass party. This 
should be understood as a two-dimensional 
concept: as a commitment to ‘small homelands’, 
local patriotism and the traditional regions of 
Bavaria (Franconia, Swabia and Old Bavaria); as 
well as the pursuit of balanced development for 
the whole of the province. The idea of the Hei-
mat, which is the motto of Bavarian patriotism 
and social solidarity, allows the CSU to act as 
the voice of the entire province, for residents 
of both the country and the cities. Most Bavar-
ians live in rural areas (7.1 million, compared 
to 5.6 million in the cities), and this is unlikely 
to change in the foreseeable future (over the 
next two decades the urban population is pro-
jected to increase by 9%, and by 3% in rural 
areas8). The importance of regionalism in the 
CSU’s policy was emphasised by the extension 
in 2014 of the provincial Ministry of Finance’s 
competence to work towards equalising the 
standard of living in all regions of Bavaria9. This 
includes the availability of medical services, 
communications, reducing unemployment in 
rural areas, and providing educational oppor-
tunities outside Bavaria’s major urban centres. 
The aims of this policy were laid out in the stra-
tegic programme presented in 2014 (Heimat 
Bayern 2020)10. After the CSU took control of 
the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2018, 
the name was changed (as happened to the 
provincial Ministry of Finance) to the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, Construction and Heimat. 
In Bavaria, regionalism is also considered as 
a marketing tool: the brand ‘Made in Heimat’ 
with which local products are marked is meant 
to signify the highest quality and show support 
for local producers.
International activity 
Bavarian regionalism and the primacy of pro-
vincial issues in the CSU’s policy interact with 
the party’s multi-dimensional foreign activity. 
Bavaria conducts the most active foreign pol-
icy of all Germany’s federal states. It serves 
the development of the province’s trading and 
cultural relations, and helps the party wield in-
fluence on the federal government’s domestic 
and foreign policy. It also strengthens the sense 
of identity and distinctiveness of both Bavaria 
and the CSU. Bavaria acts as a de facto equal 
partner in its relations with many countries, es-
8 Regionalisierte Bevölkerungsvorausberechnung für 
Bayern bis 2036, Statistical Office of the Free State of 
Bavaria, https://www.statistik.bayern.de/statistik/krei-
se/09462.pdf, p. 19.
9 The full name is Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Fi-
nanzen, für Landesentwicklung und Heimat.
10 Inhalte der Regierungserklärung Heimat Bayern 2020, 
Chancellery of the Free State of Bavaria, 27 November 
2014, https://www.stmflh.bayern.de/landesentwick-
lung/heimat/Kurzfassung%20Regierungserkl%C3%A-
4rung%20Heimat%20Bayern%202020.pdf
Bavaria conducts the most active foreign 
policy of all Germany’s federal states. It 
serves the development of the province’s 
trading and cultural relations, and the ex-
ertion of influence on the domestic and 
foreign policy of the federal government.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 288 7
pecially in Central and South-Eastern Europe. 
The CSU does not feel closely bound to its co-
alition agreement with the federal government 
regarding Bavaria’s foreign activity. This is man-
ifested, among other things, in its maintenance 
of close relationships with Russian politicians, in 
its disputes with the strategies developed in the 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard 
to the US, and in its cooperation with Hunga-
ry and Austria on migration issues, in contrast 
to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s position. Before 
the elections to the Bavarian parliament, the 
dispute between the CDU and CSU over the 
migrant issue brought about one of the most 
serious crises within the group since Chancellor 
Merkel took office in 2005. The CSU’s search for 
support from the Austrian chancellor Sebastian 
Kurz highlighted the party’s differences with 
the CDU over migration policy, and was also in-
tended to stem the loss of its voters to the AfD. 
The Bavarian party showed that it could mobi-
lise foreign policy allies in defence of its own in-
terests11. Its support for the foreign interests of 
Bavarian companies and its hosting of foreign 
delegations in Munich translates into the per-
ception of the CSU as a party that cares about 
the interests of its voters on a global level.
The CSU’s electoral test in Bavaria
Economic growth and low unemployment, to-
gether with the commitment to combine tradi-
tional values with understanding for the needs 
of modernisation, as well as the emphasis on 
security issues, has been quite an effective reci-
pe for the CSU’s electoral success. However, the 
party is experiencing problems in connection 
with the changes taking place in all the mass 
parties in Germany, which have translated into 
11 Kamil Frymark, Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Serious clash 
between CDU and CSU on migration policy. European 
implications, ‘OSW Analyses’, 20 June 2018; https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-06-20/
serious-clash-between-cdu-and-csu-migration-poli-
cy-european
falling support12 (see Figure 2). The scale of the 
changes is reflected in the results for the two 
major parties in Bavaria, the CSU and the SPD. 
In 1974, these two combined won 92.3% of the 
votes, but in 2008 they only managed 62.3%. 
In addition, the appearance of the AfD has 
threatened the CSU’s dominance in Bavaria and 
is accelerating the latter’s loss of voters.
These changes are structural in nature. They 
are associated with an aging population and 
changes in electoral habits. Also, the number of 
people without a permanent political affiliation 
has increased, and some voters are choosing to 
vote in order to ‘spite’ the mainstream parties, 
in an effort to express their opposition to the 
status quo. This all means that the party’s abil-
ity to mobilise new voters is weaker than be-
fore. Thanks to the influx of a large number of 
residents from other provinces, there has been 
a steady decrease in the proportion of Catho-
lic voters, which is of particular importance to 
the CSU (two thirds of Bavarian Catholics vote 
for the party13). The CSU’s effectiveness has 
also been cast into doubt by personality issues, 
as well as the way in which the electoral pro-
grammes have been presented. All these fac-
tors have contributed to a drop in support for 
the CSU, but it still remains higher than support 
for the Christian Democrats in other federal 
states and at the federal level. Another chal-
lenge for the CSU, as for the other traditional 
parties, lies in the new ways of communication 
12 Artur Ciechanowicz, Predictability lost…, op. cit.
13 G. Hopp, M. Sebaldt, B. Zeitler, Die CSU: Strukturwan-
del, Modernisierung und Herausforderungen einer 
Volkspartei, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 33–40.
Thanks to the influx of a large number of 
residents from other provinces, there has 
been a steady decrease in the proportion 
of Catholic voters, which is of particular 
importance to the CSU.
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via social media, which allow new groupings to 
reach out to voters more effectively14. In this 
respect, an analysis of the party’s strategy for 
the election campaign conducted online before 
the parliamentary elections in 2017 highlighted 
a significant advantage for the CSU’s main 
rivals in Bavaria – the AfD15. 
The opposition parties in Bavaria do not have 
much experience in the field of real govern-
ance, and their support is fragmented (the av-
erage polling for the opposition parties in the 
Bavarian parliament gives the Greens 16%, the 
SPD 13%, the AfD 12%, the Freie Wähler 10% 
and the FDP 5%)16. One of the problems for the 
opposition – especially the SPD and the Greens 
– is reaching out to voters outside the cities. 
Although these parties have managed some 
electoral success in Munich and Nuremberg 
(where the SPD governs), they have been un-
able to mobilise voters from rural areas. At-
tempts to adapt to the expectations of the 
more conservative voters outside the large cen-
tres expose these parties to charges of imitat-
ing the CSU’s policies, and in fact have counter-
productive effects.
14 The AfD has 400,000 followers on Facebook, while the 
CSU has 210,000, third in Germany after the Left Party 
(die Linke).
15 Der mißglückte Online-Wahlkampf, ‘Handelsblatt‘, 
28 September 2017, http://www.handelsblatt.com/
politik /deutschland/bundestagswahl /alle -schlag-
zeilen/cdu-und-csu-der-missglueckte-online-wahl-
kampf/20384590.html
16 With the exception of the FDP, none of the current oppo-
sition parties have formed a government in Bavaria since 
1957. Only once since World War II did the SPD create 
a majority coalition and have a prime minister in Bavaria 
(1954-7). In 1946-7 and 1950-4 the province was ruled 
by a grand coalition under the leadership of the CSU.
The AfD: an alternative to the CSU?
The AfD has benefited the most from the 
above-mentioned changes, and they will pose 
the biggest challenge to the CSU in October’s 
provincial elections, because their election pro-
grammes are similar in profile. In the Bundestag 
elections in 2017 the AfD took third place in Ba-
varia as a whole (12.4%, only 2.9 percentage 
points behind the SPD), but in 17 of 46 constit-
uencies they came ahead of the Social Demo-
crats. By voting for the AfD, the majority of vot-
ers want to express their protest (85%) against 
the erosion of German culture, the excessive 
social changes caused by immigration, and the 
excessive influence of Islam17. At the same time 
the AfD achieves its success by tactics includ-
ing exploiting the ongoing disputes in Germany 
on the understanding of the concepts of the 
nation, history, and culture of the state, which 
hitherto in Bavaria had mainly been the CSU’s 
domain. The CSU’s rivalry with other parties of 
a similar profile in Bavaria had previously been 
local in nature, and for a party firmly embed-
ded in federal policy, it was not too much of 
a challenge to suborn them. This time, howev-
er, the CSU’s rival is active at the federal level 
as well; the AfD has been pointing out the er-
rors made by the Bavarian Christian Democrats, 
and has shown the way for a departure from 
the conservative roots and the legacy of Franz 
Josef Strauss18. In the face of this criticism, the 
CSU’s closeness to the CDU is proving to be 
a handicap; the latter party has been accused 
even more strongly by the AfD of betraying 
traditional Christian Democratic values, primar-
ily with regard to migration policy, as well as 
 
17 A survey of AfD voters on the biggest threats that Ger-
many must deal with: Bundestagswahl 2017. Umfra-
gen zur AfD, ARD, 24 September 2017; https://wahl.
tagesschau.de/wahlen/2017-09-24-BT-DE/charts/umfra-
ge-afd/chart_208795.shtml
18 B. Neff, Die verkaufte Seele von Franz Josef Strauss, 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 June 2018, https://www.nzz.
ch/international/die-verkaufte-seele-von-franz-josef-
strauss-ld.1409073
The CSU’s rivalry with other parties of 
a similar profile in Bavaria had previously 
been local in nature, and for a party firmly 
embedded in federal policy, it was not too 
much of a challenge.
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security issues both domestically and on the 
European stage. The rivalry with the AfD, then, 
means that the CSU needs to make more radi-
cal emphases in its manifesto. We may even ex-
pect it to take over some of the AfD’s demands. 
Symptoms of this process can already be seen 
in the hardening of the CSU’s attitude in its dis-
pute with the CDU on migration policy19.
Post-election scenarios
A good result for the AfD in the provincial elec-
tions could permanently change the political 
system of Bavaria. Although all indications are 
that the CSU will win the elections, winning an 
absolute majority will be impossible, especially 
if both the AfD and the FDP enter the parlia-
ment. This could mean a change in the current 
party system, from one where the CSU is domi-
nant, to a coalition and the need to share pow-
19 Kamil Frymark, Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Serious clash 
between CDU and CSU on migration policy. European 
implications, ‘OSW Analyses’, 20 June 2018; https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-06-20/
serious-clash-between-cdu-and-csu-migration-poli-
cy-european
er, the results of which would include Christian 
Democratic weakness in the Bundesrat20.
A less likely scenario is that the current hegem-
ony of the CSU will be maintained, as will its 
absolute majority in the state parliament (for 
example, if the FDP does not cross the 5% 
threshold). This would involve the CSU recov-
ering part of the AfD’s electorate and returning 
to its position as the most right-wing party in 
Bavaria.
At this moment, the least likely scenario would 
seem to be the total failure of the CSU and 
a complete change of coalition. The possibility 
that the CSU might not participate in the Ba-
varian government (in the longer term) could 
lead to its withdrawal from the ruling coalition 
at the federal level, and to refocusing on pro-
vincial politics in order to rebuild its position, 
based on the principle that the primary forum 
for the CSU’s operation is Bavaria.
20 When taking decisions in the Bundesrat, coalition gov-
ernments must take into account the position of the two 
coalition partners, and in case of disagreement, they are 
to abstain from voting. So far, Bavaria has been a strong 
supporter of the Christian Democrats in the Bundesrat.
Figure 1. Bavaria’s GDP growth, compared to selected provinces and Germany as a whole, 
in 2010–2016 
Source: www.welt.de, Baden-Württemberg Statistical Office
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APPENDIX
Bavaria: economic success 
and new challenges 
Bavaria is the largest, richest and fastest grow-
ing federal state in Germany. In terms of popu-
lation (13 million) it is the second largest federal 
state in Germany. Even in 1950, the country’s 
southernmost province was still a typical agri-
cultural region; at that time a third of all work-
ers were employed in the agrarian sector, al-
though at present it employs only about 4% of 
the workforce. Bavaria’s gross domestic prod-
uct in 2017 amounted to €594 billion, bigger 
than that of Poland. Since the crisis and reces-
sion of 2008 Bavaria’s GDP has risen by 15%, 
and has shown the fastest rate of growth in 
Germany. In the quarter century since German 
reunification, Bavaria’s GDP increased by 56%. 
Bavaria’s per capita GDP (€45,810 in 2017) is 
second only to two Länder-cities, Hamburg 
and Bremen. The Bavarian economy represents 
18% of the German economy. 8 of the 30 com-
panies listed on the German DAX index have 
their headquarters in Bavaria1. The municipality 
with the highest average salary in Germany is 
located in Bavaria (Ingolstadt, €4635 gross in 
2017). Bavaria is also the second largest export-
er of Germany’s provinces (goods worth €192 
billion were exported from Bavaria in 2017). 
For years it has also boasted the country’s low-
est unemployment (2.7% in July 2018).
The foundations of Bavaria’s thriving economy 
consist above all of a strong automotive indus-
try, the internationalisation of its businesses, 
and the province’s good demographic situa-
tion, which is linked to migration from other 
federal states. The automotive industry in Ba-
varia employs about half of the people work-
ing in this sector in Germany, around 400,000 
people in more than 1100 companies. Industry 
sales in 2017 amounted to €109 billion, and 
1 The largest joint stock companies in terms of capitalisa-
tion and trading index. See M. Dollinger, München - Die 
Hauptstadt des Dax, Merkur, 3 June 2016, https://www.
merkur.de/wirtschaft/prosiebensat1-steigt-erste-bo-
ersenliga-auf-muenchen-hauptstadt-dax-6182866.html 
* Based on results from provincial elections and average levels of support in polls from October 2018 
Source: Statistical Office of the Free State of Bavaria
Figure 2. Changing support for the CSU, 1946–2018
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25% of the cars produced in Germany came 
from Bavaria. Companies such as BMW, Audi 
& Siemens and MAN have their headquarters 
in the province. Bavaria’s most important in-
dustrial sectors, in addition to the automo-
tive industry, are the pharmaceutical industry, 
technology, and optical electronics. Tourism is 
also important, generating annual revenues of 
around €24 billion (2016).
In the medium term, Bavaria also faces chal-
lenges related to changes in the way people 
work, and adapting to the 4.0 economy. This 
includes changing business models, enhanc-
ing the IT industry and developing start-ups, 
expanding the participation of emerging 
markets in exports, changes in education, as 
well as the availability of LTE Internet and the 
ability to integrate immigrants. Negligence in 
these areas could have a negative impact on 
the economy of Bavaria and threaten its con-
sistent growth, generating additional expens-
es related to social policy.
